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Abstract—We study the security challenges that arise in
opportunistic people-centric sensing, a new sensing paradigm
leveraging humans as part of the sensing infrastructure. Most
prior sensor-network research has focused on collecting and
processing environmental data using a static topology and an
application-aware infrastructure, whereas opportunistic sensing
involves collecting, storing, processing and fusing large volumes
of data related to everyday human activities. This highly dynamic
and mobile setting, where humans are the central focus, presents
new challenges for information security, because data originates
from sensors carried by people— not tiny sensors thrown in the
forest or attached to animals. In this paper we aim to instigate
discussion of this critical issue, because opportunistic peoplecentric sensing will never succeed without adequate provisions
for security and privacy. To that end, we outline several important
challenges and suggest general solutions that hold promise in this
new sensing paradigm.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Sensor networks provide tremendous potential for information collection and processing in a variety of application
domains. The first generation of sensor-network scenarios
included stationary devices sensing ephemeral features of the
environment around them. In this paper we focus on a new
kind of sensing, aimed at applications in daily life, employing
the mobile devices people already carry. Opportunistic peoplecentric sensing has been introduced as a term to describe this
new paradigm: small computational devices, carried by individuals in their daily activities, sensing information directly or
indirectly related to human activity, as well as aspects of the
environment around them [1].
This new brand of sensing induces a different set of assumptions and trade-offs than in much of the prior work on sensor
networks, requiring new thought about the communications infrastructure. Likewise, these new capabilities and architectures
pose different challenges and therefore require new solutions
for information security. First, applications will probably deal
with highly personal information, requiring a deeper attention
to privacy and anonymity than in most prior work. Second,
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modified assumptions about device and network capabilities—
including high mobility, opportunistic networking, strong but
not continuous connectivity, and relatively plentiful power—
lead to new opportunities for sensor-network architecture and
push different security solutions. For example, previous work
has focused on security solutions for resource-constrained
devices [2], [3], secure routing techniques for static sensor
networks [4]–[6], and secure data collection and aggregation in
static and fixed tree topologies [7], [8]. Other work has focused
on providing anonymity in location-based applications [9],
but we feel the trade-offs made do not allow for the rich
applications we envision; for example, there is no notion of
dynamic, anonymous tasking, thus limiting the breadth of
applications supported by a large deployment of sensors.
Given the increasing interest in people-centric sensing
applications, the time is ripe to explore new security and
privacy challenges. In this setting, sensor devices will (i) be
highly mobile, so existing security solutions assuming fixed
topologies cannot be employed; (ii) have limited resources,
but not severely so: nodes may be in frequent contact with the
Internet via Wi-Fi access points or the cellular infrastructure,
and strong cryptographic techniques can be employed (e.g., we
may assume that public-key cryptography will not significantly
degrade a sensor node’s lifetime [10]); and, critically, (iii) most
sensors will be carried by people, thus introducing privacy
concerns as well as new adversarial threat models.
This paper contributes to the discussion by surveying these
security and privacy challenges, and identifying some key
solution concepts. We hope this work will instigate further
research on this critical topic, and encourage application and
system designers to embed security and privacy features prior
to deploying systems. Security and privacy has been identified
as an important new design challenge in some urban-sensing
projects (examples: [11]–[13]) but only in passing.
In Section II, we overview opportunistic people-centric
sensing and identify the key features and assumptions driving
a need for new solutions. In Section IV, we discuss the applications enabled by this form of sensor network. In Section V,
we describe what we believe to be the new challenges and
discuss some conceptual solutions. We summarize the paper
in Section VI.

II. O PPORTUNISTIC P EOPLE -C ENTRIC S ENSING
Wireless sensor networks provide a structure for gathering
data on scales and in environments previously unattainable.
Forests and battlegrounds, oft-cited settings for sensor networks, are not the only interestingly “sensable” locales: new
research is focusing on urban areas, sensing aspects of the
environment, infrastructure, and society. In an urban setting,
one could leverage millions of personal mobile phones, and
a near-pervasive wireless-network infrastructure, to collect
sensor data on a grand scale without the need to deploy
thousands of static sensors. Thus, many researchers propose
the opportunistic-sensing model, in which people volunteer
their mobile devices to transparently collect sensor data as
they go about their daily life. Nodes adopt opportunistic
practices for sensing and networking, allowing their sensors
to be remotely tasked on someone else’s behalf, collecting
and reporting sensor data on a best-effort basis when the
conditions permit. (In a variant, participatory sensing, the
participating user is directly involved in the sensing action,
e.g., to photograph certain locations or events [14]; although
we focus on opportunistic sensing in this paper, we briefly
summarize some challenges for this variant in Section V-D.)
For example, an application measuring average temperature
in a specific room could emit a task requesting temperature
readings every five minutes from sensor nodes whose location
coordinates indicate they are within the room.
In the opportunistic-sensing model, sensor nodes are carried
by people, either directly or in their vehicles, and therefore
are conceptually tied to specific individuals. We envision
sensors built into devices such as cell phones, which are
more powerful than traditional “mote” platforms and can be
conveniently recharged on a daily basis, thus mitigating the
extreme compute and energy constraints. The sensors are
inherently mobile and the sensor data is necessarily “peoplecentric”; that is, sensing not only the surrounding environment,
but also aspects of the person and his or her social setting:
where people are and where they are going, what they are
doing and what they are seeing. While these new aspects
conjure up images of an amazing array of applications, they
also present significant security challenges.
Perhaps the most obvious concern is the security of the
sensed data itself, especially in correlation to the owner of the
device. For example, from CarTel data it is trivial to deduce
the location of a participant’s home within a small radius. How
can this information be protected? Additionally, is it possible
to allow selected people to see personal data at high fidelity,
but to present a less accurate view to less trusted viewers?
A second concern is the integrity of the sensed data. An
application based on sensor data is useless if data consumers
cannot trust the accuracy or timeliness of the data. Is it possible
to operate an open, cooperative network of human-carried
sensor devices when some of the people, or some elements
of the infrastructure, cannot be trusted to communicate sensor
data accurately and quickly?
A third concern is the privacy of the user with respect to his

or her participation in the system. Can a participant trust the
systems not to track their location, which sensing tasks they
execute, or which reports they submit?
On the other hand, many of the security solutions already
addressed in the sensor-network literature do not apply to
opportunistic, people-centric, urban-sensing scenarios. In “traditional” sensor networks, such as a stationary collection of
mote-class devices connected by an ad hoc wireless network,
the nodes are configured, deployed, and operated by the
same party that desires the sensor data, the nodes are not
sensing human behavior, and the main concerns are about
an adversary that wishes to intercept or tamper with the
data in transit, disrupt the routing of packets in the network,
re-task the nodes inappropriately, or prevent the legitimate
retasking of nodes. Substantial research attention has been
paid, for example, to secure key management and distribution
schemes [15]–[17], or to secure retasking solutions such as
Deluge [18] and Sluice [19]. The network infrastructure used
by most opportunistic-sensing systems, however, is not owned
or operated by any one party, and usually not by the same party
that wishes to collect the sensor data nor by the individuals
who own and operate the mobile devices used as sensor nodes.
Neither party will necessarily trust the network infrastructure;
the data consumers can not trust the sensor nodes or the people
carrying them; conversely, those people will not necessarily
trust the system that collects the data or the applications that
use the data. The trust models are far more complex than those
considered in most sensor-network literature.
Furthermore, an urban environment, the pervasive coverage
of Wi-Fi and cellular networks means that multi-hop routing
seems less necessary. [Through their experiments, the CarTel
project [20] revealed the existence of more than enough open
wireless access points to allow the uploading of data to an
aggregation point on the Internet.] Although the multi-hop
structure of early sensor networks inspired the development of
secure routing protocols, in urban-sensing scenarios the focus
should be on securing the data rather than securing the route.
Thus, the opportunistic-sensing model induces many challenges: incenting users to volunteer their device for data
collection, leveraging the uncontrolled mobility of the sensors,
managing a system that scales to millions of sensor nodes,
protecting the privacy of the users who volunteer their devices,
protecting the integrity of the data from human adversaries,
and operating in a distributed-trust environment resulting
from the involvement of multiple resource providers and
administrating organizations. Other than our own AnonySense
system [21], we are not aware of any proposed people-centric
opportunistic sensing systems that incorporate security at the
foundation of their design. System designs ignoring security
and privacy, or attempting to achieve such through security by
obscurity, are inadequate and are unlikely to succeed.
In the later sections we detail the challenges related to
security and privacy. First, we describe example systems and
example applications, and identify security and privacy issues
therein.

III. E XAMPLES : U RBAN SENSING PROJECTS
Opportunistic, people-centric urban sensing has already
been a topic of study in the community. Here are some current
research projects working in this area; we often use the first
two as points of reference in our exposition.
CarTel: The CarTel project [20] uses small Linux-based
computers installed in vehicles to map traffic patterns in
Boston and Seattle. The computer contains sensors of its own
(e.g., GPS) and attaches to the vehicle’s on-board diagnostic
(OBD) interface to measure location, direction, speed, acceleration, and other parameters. CarTel’s delay-tolerant networking stack, CafNet, takes advantage of randomly-encountered
unrestricted wireless access points to upload sensed data
to a relational database on the Internet. A web-based user
interface provides access to the database, and allows for
modification of data-gathering rules, such as time granularity.
Applications enabled by the CarTel project include traffic
monitoring, automotive diagnostics and notification, and roadsurface diagnostics. Note that these applications are peoplecentric: the producers of the data are ordinary people (in their
cars), and the consumers of this data are also ordinary users,
not specialized scientists studying the environment.
MetroSense: Similarly, MetroSense [1] envisions a future
in which the Internet is dominated by data from sensors
carried by people during their daily life. The core ideas in
MetroSense include opportunistic tasking of personal mobile
devices, opportunistic sharing of sensors between neighboring
nodes, and the use of smart phones as a large-scale platform
for opportunistic people-centric sensing. Prototype applications include BikeNet [22], in which bicycles outfitted with
multiple sensor nodes communicate with each other and with
neighboring bikes as well as the network infrastructure, and
CenceMe [23], in which mobile phones collect data about a
user’s activity and share it with buddies via a social network.
Other urban-sensing projects: Intel Research has collaborated with UC Berkeley to develop a stable of applications
involving urban sensing, dubbed Urban Atmospheres [24].
These applications range from air quality testing to placebased ringtones. Additional projects related to urban sensing
include Mobiscopes [11], Urbanet [12], CENS Urban Sensing [13], and SenseWeb [25].
IV. E XAMPLES : A PPLICATIONS
We give some examples of opportunistic-sensing applications to motivate that paradigm and to motivate the accompanying security challenges.
Urban data collection and processing: We anticipate that
opportunistic sensing will encourage large-scale, on-line data
collection and processing of context information related to
aspects of everyday life, such as locating lost objects [26],
or measuring the flow of bicycles in an urban center [27].
For instance, an Active Map [28, for example] represents the
location and context of people on a geographical map: students
at a university can view the location of their friends on campus, and possibly also information collected by personal and
embedded sensors (indicating, for example, that they are in a

conversation or are asleep). Recent examples include commercial projects such as Dodgeball.com and BoostMobile.com,
which provide location-based “friend finder” services where
users are notified of friends in the vicinity, or can view the
locations of their friends on a map. Other systems, such as
CenceMe [23], allow sharing of activity information via socialnetwork services. The Mobile Media Metadata project [29]
attempts to leverage the location context of cameras to tag
photographs with metadata describing their contents. Active
Maps could also display historical information, such as the
most frequently used running trails, indicating, e.g., which
may be muddy or contain steep uphill sections. BikeNet [22]
is one such project, aimed at cyclists who would like to share
real-time sensor data. The map can also be an interface for
registering context-sensitive triggers, such as “remind me to
buy milk when I am next driving past the grocery store”, “alert
me when both Bob and Alice are back in the office,” or “let
me know when a tennis court is available at the park.”
Environmental monitoring at the human level: With
human-centric sensing, applications that monitor the human
environment (such as building maintenance and HVAC) now
may become more efficient and useful. It becomes possible to
sense and collect information (such as indoor air temperature)
at the human level. Thus, the environment is sensed exactly
where its semantics are important: at the person, rather than
on the wall. One could optimize energy usage, for example,
by reducing effort to heat, cool, or ventilate classrooms when
the classroom appears empty, or to adjust office temperature
as needed for the person sitting at the desk in the corner.
Many have proposed efforts to collect data about traffic [30], pot holes [31], or noise pollution [32]. The Personal
Environmental Impact Report provides a pollution-exposure
report based on the a cell phone’s location trace and public
data from (stationary) air-quality sensors [33]. Eventually,
if people carry devices that include environmental sensors,
environmental monitoring can be achieved with far less static
infrastructure. With the advent of mobile sensors, personal
devices can help monitor levels of hazardous gases, generating
alerts or collecting long-term trends. (The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security is considering this very strategy in its CellAll project [34].)
V. S ECURITY C HALLENGES
These people-centric sensing applications entail serious security and privacy risks. Unrestricted dissemination of users’
sensor data results in breaches of privacy; users will want to
control who may access information about themselves. Also,
since data originates from sensors that are under the control of
other people, the integrity of the data comes into question. For
example, a user may tamper with a sensor device to cause it to
report false data, or misrepresent the location or time the data
was sensed. Furthermore, the availability of the infrastructure
is critical for these applications to remain useful. In this section
we outline specific challenges regarding privacy, integrity, and
availability.

A. Confidentiality and Privacy Issues
The confidentiality of sensed data goes far beyond the provision of a secure channel from the sensor node to some gateway
node. Such encryption, and in particular key distribution,
has already been well-discussed in sensor-network security
literature. We focus on the privacy challenges associated with
the collection and dissemination of sensor data.
Challenge 1: Context privacy: While several systems have
been proposed to address specific types of sensor data (e.g.,
location privacy in pervasive environments [35], [36] and
privacy of medical data from body sensors [37]), usable
mechanisms to protect the privacy of more general types of
context have been lacking. It is cumbersome for users to
specify fine-grained policies, and users are not particularly
good at it [38]. It will be harder to do when multiple types
of context are involved—who should know whether they are
awake, who should know whether they are in a conversation,
who should get access to heart-rate information, and so on. In a
people-centric sensing environment, context privacy is of high
importance. To this end, we have proposed virtual walls [39]
as a usable metaphor for controlling access to users’ context
information.
Virtual walls intuitively map to real walls in the physical world. For example, transparent virtual walls allow the
release of personal context information much as a person’s
physical actions are fully visible through a real transparent
wall. We also define intuitive semantics for translucent and
opaque virtual walls. Still, for a real-world deployment, several
challenges remain: users may want more precise access control
for some types of context information, and hybrid mechanisms
are needed that can balance ease of use and a larger degree
of control. Another intriguing approach is based on a different
metaphor: users pre-define a small set of disclosure policies,
thinking of each one as a different public “face” they might
wear [40]. In different situations, the user dons a different face.
There are several instances where groups of users should
take ownership over data—for example, a team of athletes
may want to control access to their sensor data as a group.
Negotiation of group policies in a seamless and usable way
will be a challenge. Furthermore, it may be desirable to have
the negotiation preserve the privacy of users within the group,
who may want to vote on policies without being implicated
or singled out. We anticipate that schemes based on secure
multiparty computation (SMC) may be helpful [41], [42]; in
SMC, functions can be evaluated while maintaining the privacy
of the individual inputs. We also recommend exploring the use
of trusted hardware for performance reasons. For example, a
trusted server can receive all the users inputs and compute
the outcome within the aegis of the tamper-resistant trusted
hardware [43], [44].
Consolvo et al. [45] found that when it comes to sharing
location information, users were interested in knowing why the
information was being demanded and in responding with the
appropriate level of information to satisfy those requests. If
these findings do indeed apply to other kinds of context, how

can solutions such as Virtual Walls incorporate this “why?”
component without sacrificing usability? How these needs
are expressed by the requester, and how the responder can
trust that the data will not be used for some other reason,
are interesting challenges. Khalil and Connelly [46] found
that the type of context matters in making policy decisions.
While models such as Virtual Walls can be extended to protect
different types of context (beyond the “personal” and “general”
categories), how to do so while maintaining the usability of
such models remains a challenge. Lastly, an adversary may
be able to infer restricted context information from other
available context information. Care must be taken, therefore,
to ensure that context is not inadvertently leaked. Preventing
such inferences is indeed challenging, and is an important area
for future research.
Challenge 2: Anonymous tasking: One of the exciting
aspects of the new opportunistic-sensing paradigm is that user
devices may be tasked to sense areas beyond the reach of a
system’s static infrastructure. Tasking of users, however, can
be a threat to their privacy. For example, assigning the task
“measure temperature at location X” to Alice may reveal the
time at which she visited location X. Furthermore, Alice may
not want the system to know her location at the instant when
she was tasked. It is important, therefore, to ensure that users
can be tasked anonymously. In many cases, what is tasked is
more important than who is tasked.
Delivering tasks to anonymous users may seem easy. For
example, users can choose to not identify themselves with the
system, and receive tasks through beacons. Users who wish
to accept the tasks can notify the system (without revealing
their identity) of their acceptance, and then finally report the
data. In our AnonySense system [21], [47] users periodically
download all available tasks from a Tasking Service when they
are in public locations. The Tasking Service thus learns only
that some user in some public location downloaded tasks, and
thus the user’s privacy is maintained.
Such an approach, however, does not guarantee that the
user is likely to deliver on that task. It would be useful if
the system could predict which users are most likely to visit
a particular location and opportunistically task those devices
directly. Or, perhaps, the system may want to task certain
“reliable” people, or classes of people, for a particular task.
Reddy et al., for example, are developing a mechanism to
quantify the reliability of participants in a participatory sensing
application [48]. Such functionality is at odds with maintaining
anonymity, and an approach that balances anonymity with
location-prediction algorithms and reputation-based tasking is
needed.
One solution that looks promising is attribute-based authentication, which ensures that users can authenticate themselves
by revealing only their attributes, and not their identities. For
example Alice might reveal that she is a “student at Dartmouth” without disclosing her identity. Several cryptographic
primitives exist that allow users to prove they possess a certain
set of credentials without revealing their identity. Following
such authentication, users can be given specific tasks as long

as they possess the requisite attributes. Such techniques will
interfere with any approach that relies on user identity for
ensuring the integrity of sensed data. Solutions that address
privacy, therefore, will need to be designed with data integrity
in mind. We discuss challenges for integrity in Section V-B.
Another solution would be to allow the system to task
specific users by identity, but without knowing their current
location, providing them with location privacy [49], [50]. For
example, the system may want to task Alice, specifically, to
sense a given location X. A mechanism to deliver tasks to
Alice, whose present location is hidden, could rely on an
anonymizing network such as Tor [51].
The user being tasked is not the only one potentially at
risk: the person issuing tasks needs to be considered as well.
Perhaps users will be willing to accept tasks only from certain
other users, which brings up the question of how much privacy
should be supported for queriers. Perhaps techniques from trust
negotiation could be used [52], in which both the querier and
the user being tasked have their own requirements of each
other. Some trust-negotiation techniques [53, for example]
address the privacy of users in trust negotiation.
Challenge 3: Anonymous data reporting: Regardless of
whether tasks were delivered anonymously, users may want
to report sensor data without the system knowing their current
location. For example, Alice may want to report her personal
sensor data to a trusted database, without the system knowing
where she is at the time she uploads the data. Protecting
Alice’s location from the system infrastructure, however, can
be challenging—simply identifying the wireless access point
through which she makes a network connection can localize
Alice.
As we do in AnonySense [21], one solution is to use an
anonymizing network to hide Alice’s location while she is
reporting data, e.g., by bouncing data between the anonymizing network’s nodes several times before the data goes to the
database. If one organization manages all the nodes, however,
a system administrator may be able to correlate routing information and infer Alice’s location. Trusted-computing hardware
platforms (such as the Trusted Platform Module) may solve
this problem by ensuring that even the human operators of
access points are not privy to sensitive routing information.
Tang et al. [9] propose a technique called hitchhiking, where
users report data anonymously, but only include characteristics
about a location. We disagree with their claim that no personal
information about the individual is leaked. For example, Alice
may be known to be the only frequent user of a coffee shop at
2am on Sunday nights. A report from that location at around
that time could imply that Alice is at the coffee shop. Additional techniques such as blurring [54] would be needed to
reduce such inferences. If Alice is concerned about the privacy
of her location at the time she collected the sensed data, she
could blur the location and time of the sensed information—
to add some random jitter, within acceptable limits. Such
perturbations may make it difficult to correlate or aggregate
sensor information, however, unless the amount of error can
be constrained. It may be possible to use techniques developed

for privacy-sensitive data-mining and database queries [55].
Our AnonySense system [47] supports automatic spatiotemporal blurring of the time and location in a report by tessellating the geographical region into tiles. Users report sensor
data at the granularity of tiles in discrete time intervals, which
provide a statistical guarantee of k-anonymity [56] (k users
are expected to visit that tile every 5 minutes, for example).
It is also important to anonymize the sensor data itself, of
course. One approach, based on k-anonymity, would be to
combine at least k reports before they are revealed. This would
ensure that there are enough people present in a particular
reporting area, adding enough “confusion” in the data to make
it difficult to pinpoint exact times and locations (and sensor
data) for the individuals reporting the data. Another approach
is to develop protocols that allow people to contribute sensitive
data to an untrustworthy data collector, but with mechanisms
that allow them to prove negligence if a data leak occurs [57].
In some settings, k-anonymity may be threatened by shadow
attacks [58], in which mobile users obtain service from an
overly curious service provider. Even when requests are made
anonymously, if the provider can observe future actions made
by the user then the provider may be able to link requests to
the user.
Another interesting problem related to anonymous reporting
is that of status reporting. Users in the system may be interested in querying the status of various sensors in the network,
and then making tasking decisions based on the characteristics
of available sensors. Responses to status queries, however,
may reveal enough information about the sensors’ carriers to
threaten their privacy. Such functionality appears to be at odds
with anonymous tasking, however; perhaps a standard subset
of information can be reported to the system, e.g., location
and availability of (the anonymous) nodes.
B. Integrity Issues
If an opportunistic-sensing system provides anonymity to
those nodes that are tasked, and to those nodes that submit
reports, it is difficult to guarantee the integrity of information.
If a user misbehaves by falsifying data, that user cannot be
blocked from reporting more data if allowed full anonymity.
Finding a solution that balances privacy with data integrity
will be a major challenge in such systems. We discuss these
integrity challenges next.
Challenge 4: Reliable data readings: Traditional sensor
networks face the problem of data reliability; the literature
already notes limitations on detecting or correcting datapollution attacks [8] (for example). In people-centric environments, however, trustworthiness of data becomes more
crucial: the adversary is no longer only a malicious outsider
capturing a subset of sensor nodes; now any participant with
an appropriately-configured device can report falsified data.
Because users are in control of their own devices, they can
more easily launch such an attack. Furthermore, given the
more personal nature of applications, they have an increased
interest in doing so. For instance, privacy issues or activities
that expose anomalous behavior can now be considered strong

incentives for people to perform simple data-pollution attacks
to protect themselves. How could a system prevent, detect or
correct such behaviors?
Attacks against the sensed-data reliability can be launched
using software or hardware. A misbehaving user may first attempt to tamper with the software running on the personal device hosting the sensor(s)—this is a relatively easy-to-perform
attack requiring some advanced computer/hacker skills. In
this case, the use of trusted hardware can provide a possible
practical solution. This has been, for instance, the approach
our AnonySense system [21] uses for preventing such software
attacks: by leveraging a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [43]
within the sensor node, the proper configuration and sensing
functionality can be verified by some designated registration
authority and then ensured by the trustworthy hardware.
However, specialized hardware can be used also by misbehaving users to produce incorrect sensed-data values. Here, a
promising solution area is redundancy. In a large-scale urbansensing infrastructure, it may be possible to provide multiple
sensor nodes with the same task. The system could then use
appropriate statistical processing algorithms to estimate the
validity of the data, or to remove polluted subsets. For instance,
appropriate statistical mechanisms could detect bias or correct
malicious responses in survey data. Moreover, since incorrect
data can be introduced not only due to malicious user actions
but also due to erroneous configurations of the sensor devices,
additional correction mechanisms can be considered. Using
these statistical mechanisms, the system could report confidence levels about the quality of reports arriving from sensors.
The system could then provide anonymous feedback [59] to
the sensor nodes that have returned low-confidence reports,
following which honest nodes can recalibrate their sensors.
The system could also temporarily “revoke” the node’s ability
to report data using an anonymous blocking or revocation
system [60]–[62]. Such mechanisms even support “threestrikes-out” policies, where an anonymous node, which has
been given ample feedback, and yet has sent multiple bad
reports, would be blocked. Finally, certain ground-truth enforcing techniques can be used to increase the confidence
level of sensed data measurements. For instance, if the system
infrastructure includes some physically secure access points
with sensors of their own (as proposed in MetroSense [1]), one
can use these measurements as representative high-weight or
“ground-truth” data points that help in detecting and correcting
falsification attacks. Alternately, support from the network
infrastructure can attest to the time and location that sensor
data was uploaded [63].
Another approach, based on game-theoretic principles, is to
couple strong pollution-detection capabilities with punishment
strategies (such as exclusion of misbehaving parties [64],
[65]). If applied selectively, this approach could encourage
fairness and provide a strong disincentive for misbehavior.
Alternatively, a reputation-based algorithm could be used
as incentive for cooperation by assigning more weight to
data returned by trustworthy sensors, perhaps determined by
consensus. A complicating constraint on any of these solutions

is to maintain the desired anonymity properties while also
enforcing punishment or measuring reputation.
Challenge 5: Data authenticity: Another fundamental security problem is data authentication; that is, how can sensed data
be delivered to a database or application with assurance that
no intermediate devices have tampered with it? Furthermore,
in applications that care about the identity of the user carrying
the sensor (for example, to report Alice’s location on an active
map), how can the system ensure the identity of the sensor
node and its custodian?
A significant amount of research has been conducted on
data authenticity in static sensor networks, especially in the
context of secure in-network data aggregation. Several threat
models have been studied, including fault-tolerant computation
of aggregates [66, for example] and secure aggregation in the
presence of single [67], [68] or multiple [7], [8], [69], [70,
for example] adversarial sensor nodes. Also, various models
of in-network data aggregation have been considered, including the star-based [8], [71], [72] and tree-based aggregation
models [7], [73]. Aggregation of encrypted data has been also
studied [74]–[76].
Unfortunately, these solutions are not feasible for mobile
sensor networks. First, previous authentication techniques assume the availability of a stable topological tree that spans the
network’s sensors. In a highly dynamic and mobile network
no such tree structure exists or can be maintained. At the
same time, opportunistic networking, tasking, data muling,
and delay-tolerant data reporting create an inherently complex
communication environment in which few assumptions can be
made about node integrity. Moreover, the previous research
using mobile sensor nodes has focused on sensors attached to
animals and vehicles.
Human carriers introduce new challenges for maintaining
node integrity. Although we still need low-level mechanisms to
authenticate a sensor node, we need more sophisticated notions
of user identity, group membership, and other attributes—
for instance, group signatures can be employed as in the
AnonySense system [21] to anonymously verify the validity
of mobile sensing nodes. In many human-centric sensing applications these factors may evolve over time, perhaps quickly,
due to privacy profile updates, role changes, revocation of
reporting rights, or task-specific requirements. This complexity
and dynamism in people-centric sensing introduces additional
security concerns regarding system trustworthiness.
Thus we need new schemes to authenticate the user and her
sensor device, and to ensure the integrity of the data, based
on few assumptions about network topology. We have some
advantages relative to existing sensor-network literature: we
may assume that sensor nodes are fairly capable platforms,
and that they frequently come into direct contact with network access points. Desired properties include computationaland bandwidth-efficient authentication, topology-independent
techniques, resilience against malicious subsets of nodes, and
resistance against denial-of-service attacks. Results on the authentication of streams in arbitrary adversarial networks using
cryptographically-enhanced error-correcting techniques [77],

[78] may give some insight in this direction.
Challenge 6: System integrity: Another important aspect of
integrity relates to the functionality of the underlying system.
In principle, any operation (in addition to data collection) performed in a mobile, opportunistic, participatory1 , and highly
untrusted sensor network will need some form of correctness
verification.
For instance, these people-centric sensor networks, likely
based on pervasive devices such as cell phones, are an application platform as well as a sensing device. These applications
need to be able to authenticate the information they receive
from the system, and to determine when to trust the tasks
they are asked to perform. One possible solution is to develop
task-specification languages allowing a node to verify that
execution of a particular task will not compromise the node
itself. Such a procedure presents a trade-off between simplicity
of verification and flexibility in describing complex tasks.
A long history of research on the safe execution of mobile
code [79] should be instructive.
Also, information centers will need to validate the integrity
of actions (e.g., tasking, data muling, data collection) performed by mobile nodes at remote sites, often in a delaytolerant fashion. How, for instance, can the system administrator of a sensing-based information system be sure that tasking
is executed correctly or that reported data not only is authentic
but also is temporally relevant? Suggested solutions on this
front include developing efficient verification protocols that ensure secure data management and guarantee system integrity.
Conceptually, the system administrator could maintain some
secure cryptographic state of the entire system configuration,
consisting of various topological, temporal, and user-related
parameters. This cryptographic state could be updated and
used for verification as network nodes execute queries, tasking
commands, and other operations. This general approach recalls
early results on memory consistency checking [80].
In general, any mechanism designed for system integrity
depends on the specific threat or trust model. For instance,
in an application where the focus lies on collection and offline fusion of sensed data, certain components of infrastructure
may be considered trusted by the system administrator; for
example, “sensor access points” in MetroSense [1] may be
considered to have higher levels of trust, whether implemented
through physical protection or the use of secure hardware.
C. Availability Issues
Researchers have addressed some of the denial of service
(DoS) issues for static sensor networks—for example, adversaries may gain control of sensors and try to flood the
network or subvert the routing protocols to affect the network’s
reporting capabilities [81]. Opportunistic sensing, however,
introduces different DoS issues because devices are already
in the hands of potential adversaries. On the other hand,
1 System integrity is a central concern in any participatory distributed
system. For instance, in Seti@Home, the biggest distributed computing project
on the planet, 50% of the project’s resources have been spent dealing with
various security problems.

because we assume high connectivity (sensors are frequently
in contact with a Wi-Fi or cellular access points), the sensing
infrastructure itself is less susceptible—though not entirely
immune—to DoS than in some sensor-network scenarios. We
briefly mention three distinct aspects related to the availability
of urban sensing systems.
Challenge 7: Preventing data suppression: Although most
opportunistic sensor networks are designed as a best-effort service, in which sensor data are submitted by nodes volunteered
by their human owners, DoS attacks limit the availability of
data and are still a concern. If nodes are meant to be tasked
opportunistically, their owners may configure their device to
refuse to accept certain tasks, or to accept but then ignore
the tasks. (Contrast this behavior with “traditional” sensor
networks, where installed sensors faithfully report data unless
they break or are compromised by an external adversary.)
Data-consuming applications are left at the mercy and whims
of the individual participants. This problem is exacerbated by
privacy concerns—if users feel unable to control access to their
data, they will be disinclined to carry the device or permit
tasks that report such sensor data. This effect reinforces the
importance of the privacy challenges above, and leads directly
to the next challenge.
Challenge 8: Participation: Unlike static sensor networks,
where sensors are embedded in the infrastructure, opportunistic people-centric sensing relies on the sensor devices carried
by users. One of the major challenges today is to create
incentives for users to carry such devices, especially if bulky or
a threat to their privacy. The best approach is to incorporate the
sensors into a device they want to carry (such as a cell phone
or music player), and provide incentives that are compatible
with users’ needs and interests. Depending on the application’s
goals, the sensing coverage and density of the sensing system
are also important issues, i.e., what percentage of a city is
covered or what percentage of the population carries a certain
sensor type. If the device has applications with clear direct
and indirect benefits for the user, has strong, usable measures
that protect privacy, and is easy to carry, people will use it. In
general, the more data-secure and user-private a participatory
human-centric sensing system is, the more individuals are
likely to contribute to its services.
Another promising direction towards increasing people’s
participation in these systems is the use of game-theoretic
approaches. Users’ behavior in participatory systems can be
studied using privacy-aware hybrid payoff models, where users
care (primarily) about the services they benefit from, but also
(secondarily) about the privacy loss they experience during
their participation in the system. In particular, privacy-aware
mechanism design using rational cryptography (cf. [82]) could
lead to the design of concrete practical protocols for opportunistic context sensing, that would be followed by rational
participants under reasonable assumptions about their systemusage preferences and their privacy concerns.
Challenge 9: Fairness: Many people-centric sensor applications provide direct benefits to the users who carry the sensor
nodes. Thus, people have an incentive to cheat, to obtain

better service for themselves than they fairly deserve. For
example, users may cause the applications to task many other
sensors to collect information for their own needs, without
being willing to take on tasks for other users. Research on
incentive-compatible peer-to-peer systems [83] or, as above,
privacy-aware game-theoretic mechanism design, may provide
useful insight here.
D. Challenges in Participatory Sensing
In participatory sensing, the sensing operation requires
some kind of human intervention [84]. For example, the task
may ask the user to take a photograph of the menu when
she visits a restaurant, or to comment on her opinion about
the food at the restaurant, or to record the gas prices when
she passes a filling station [85]. The human element adds
additional security challenges. With respect to privacy, the
user may leak more information about his or her identity by
the nature of his or her response. For example, the (artistic)
composition of the user’s photographs may reveal information
about the user, or the background may reveal additional
context beyond the information being sensed. A user’s textual
response may contain grammatical errors, abbreviations, or
other clues about the user’s identity. With respect to integrity,
the user now has an easy way to fabricate “sensor” data of
his or her choosing, and the reliability of data now depends
on the ability of the user to respond to tasks effectively.
With respect to availability, users can easily suppress data by
either not responding to tasks, or by responding to tasks with
data that is not useful. Participation will be reduced because
requiring human intervention is disruptive, and users would
need incentives to participate in such sensing.
VI. S UMMARY
In this paper we recognize the current interest in opportunistic people-centric sensing applications and infrastructure. Such
applications have clear and substantial security and privacy
challenges, which must be resolved if these systems have any
hope of realizing their potential. We described 9 challenges,
and offered conceptual solution approaches for each.
Challenge
Challenge
Challenge
Challenge
Challenge
Challenge
Challenge
Challenge
Challenge

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

Context privacy
Anonymous tasking
Anonymous data reporting
Reliable data readings
Data authenticity
System integrity
Preventing data suppression
Participation
Fairness

We hope that this paper will create a substantive discussion
around these challenges and encourage all researchers involved
with opportunistic sensing, participatory sensing, urban sensing, and people-centric sensor networks to address security
and privacy at a fundamental level within their system and
application design. The future of the paradigm depends on it.
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